Introduction

The Dispositif photographique: A Politics of the Face

In European culture, the face is much more than an ensemble of features at the front of the human head. It is a complex semiotic matrix of traits which are decoded as markers of biological sex and age, ethnic origin, moral character, as indicators of individuality, of social determination or of mental states. In the absence of a unifying semiology, the various scientific and moralistic attempts at systematically reading faces have led to what Ulrich Raulff calls a “European politics of faces” [europäische Gesichterpolitik], the history of which includes the history of portraiture. Individuals were recognised and recognised themselves through the face more than through any other feature.

The modern individual which has emerged since the Middle Ages has, to an increasing extent, been singled out, described and represented through administrative procedures within which visual portraiture first played only a minor role. Until the ascent of photography, portraiture was generally restricted to the powerful and the wealthy, on the one hand, and to the representation of anonymous character types and ethnic specimens on the other. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, there was a reversal of the political function of portraiture. From being a medium of the extraordinary and the typical, it became a universal aspect of an individual’s existence. “From now on, nobody will any longer live without an image, without a face: between 1870 and 1890 we see something like the birth of the homo photographicus, of the modern Image Man.”[1]

The main function of this book is to trace the epistemological circumstances of this birth in the discourses of such human sciences as anthropology, psychiatry, criminology, or criminalistics. How is it that a supposedly universal and identical relationship was established between a photograph and an individual? who or what is the social agent who recognises him- or herself in a portrait photograph, and who is recognised in order to become the object of scientific or administrative scrutiny? how is the link established between an individual body and one of the many possible meanings of a portrait photograph? what is the relationship between classificatory and identificational uses of portrait photography? how does the reception of other people’s portraits impinge on the observer’s self-conception? and what happens in the ruptures and cleavages of these discursive formations?

In his works of the early 1980s, Michel Foucault began to tackle the problem of modern subjectivity by analysing processes of subjectification as effects of certain self-techniques, and as structural elements of governmental strategies which, since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have sought to increase the power of the state and the well-being of its members by ordering the population into segmented, individuated formations. In the nineteenth century, the human sciences acquired a pivotal status in this scenario by comprehensively describing the modern individual and by devising micropolitical strategies and techniques for subjecting it to the governmental order.[2] The human sciences formed part of a modern complex of power and knowledge which was more than a crude apparatus of scientific and political objectification. Foucault has shown how the disciplinary apparatuses often hinged on regimes of subjectification in which the individual itself applied techniques that would foster its integral status within the social formation. For an understanding of the genealogy of the modern individual, these techniques and discursive practices have to come under close scrutiny. “The recognisable human (soul, individuality, consciousness, conscience, behaviour) is an effect/object of this analytical documentation, of this government/observation.”[3]

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, photography has joined the ranks of such techniques as the most important medium of facial representation. Recent criticism has outlined a number of research areas for a history of the nineteenth-century photographic portrait: the studio portrait as ideological form (Tagg), anthropological photography (Green), police photography (Phéline, Sekula), and scientific photography in general (Merzeau).[4] These and other authors have emphasised the historical specificity of photographic meaning, and have analysed its discursive generation in specific instances. From this criticism has emerged an understanding of the dispositif photographique as an ensemble of material installations and operations, and of discursive practices, which was strategically applied to produce social effects, like the identification of an individual with a passport photograph. The administrative procedures and social practices surrounding the application of photographs linked the dispositif photographique to the formations of governmentality and thus served to structure social power.

The use of the term dispositif photographique underpins the claim that photography had a significant strategic function within the human scientific discourses of the nineteenth century. Generally speaking, the dispositif can be understood as a heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and non-discursive elements which participate in a given, strategic form of coordination; the dispositif is an “ideological (conceptual) device” (L. Althusser), a set of material appliances which allow the realisation of strategic operations.[5] In the case of photography, it is made up of the material installations and operations conducted in and outside the photographic studio, as well as of the discourses that thread through the journals, books and private correspondences of the period. The photographic discourses and practices we will examine are at the same time part of the dispositif of the human sciences which form the matrix for the ordering of knowledge and for the regulation of certain types of deviance, and photography is itself a dispositif on which mechanisms of subjectification rest. As a social technology, portrait photography circumscribes a space of visuality in which the human sciences not only find a new type of object, but which also forms the basis of a new relation to the self for the social agents themselves.

The homo photographicus of the nineteenth century inhabited a terrain that ranged from the human scientific disciplines to the police administration and the highstreet studio, from the domains of anthropological and social deviance and its articulations to the field of social normality which was populated by non-deviant citizens and workers, and public figures such as politicians, artists, and other celebrities, all scattered by degrees of respectability and fame, pathologisation and normalisation.[6] Their complex classificatory order was over-determined by the assumption of structural dichotomies - wealth/poverty, health/sickness, honour/repression - which form part of the identificatory tools of modern bourgeois individualism. Our analysis departs from the hypothesis of a continuous matrix on which the socio-economic distribution and the structures of normalcy are permeated by a set of dispositifs of representation which articulate that matrix and turn its elements into sites and tools of contestation. The act of ordering, and most prominently of classifying, is among the prime strategies deployed in this contest. Identification and characterisation should be understood as subsidiary strategies which involve subjectifying and subjectified acts of (self-)classification.

Portraiture as an art historical genre had fulfilled this classificatory role to a far more limited degree. The definition of the portrait applied here encompasses mimetic visual representations of human bodies. Portraits form part of semiotic systems in which they overdetermine the physical body with notions of type, identity, character, etc. The tradition of artistic, graphic and painted, portraiture formed a prime source of inspiration for the composition, posing and the setting of portrait photographs, yet, although it is possible to point to a number of such continuities, a more general assessment reveals a decisive break in the visual representation of individuals after the middle of the nineteenth century. A brief look at some exemplary recent publications can elucidate the theoretical and historical points of departure from the art historical debate about portraiture.[7]

Especially over the last decade, an increasing number of studies have dealt with particular topical areas of portraiture, with important foci on the Italian and German Renaissance, and on the English eighteenth century. An exception forms the essay Portraiture by Richard Brilliant who attempts to give a general theoretical account of portraiture as a phenomenon in Western art from Antiquity to the twentieth century.[8] There are more problems than benefits in Brilliant’s broad approach which hinges on the contention that the portrait establishes a fixed relation between portrait and sitter that is established by the artist’s intention. The text is often theoretically opaque, but Brilliant assumes a primordial correlation between identification and the individual, whose “uniquely private kernel of being, […] persistent inner character or ‘soul’” is to be made transparent by the artist.[9] The artist, the sitter and the viewer are presented as ‘full’ and self-conscious social agents who jointly realise and guarantee the meaning in portraiture. What is confusing about Brilliant’s book is that, from a patchwork of constructivist observations about the forces involved in portraiture, he constantly reverts to a humanistic essentialism which defeats his arguments about the complexities of facial representation and perception. Most importantly, however, Brilliant deliberately avoids historical specificity, moving freely through centuries and millennia, and essentially treating portraiture as a single, homogeneous phenomenon, bracketed by his common sense.

Of the historically more specific studies, the literature on Renaissance portraiture often focuses on the commemorative and self-explicatory aspects of what are seen as early documents of the modern individual.[10] The archaeological interest in the historically new construction of a self-image leads to an emphasis on the artist’s intention, the sitter’s self-conception, and the process of artistic production. This triangle plays an even greater role in the case of self-portraiture, a field that has recently been extended by Joseph Koerner’s analysis of the productive aspects of the reception of Renaissance self-portraits. Hermeneutically inclined authors like Koerner and Gottfried Boehm read paintings as visual texts whose semantic productivity emerges from the visual experience they offer to the viewer. It is rather dubious how the direct, identificational linking of sitter and representation generally goes unquestioned in these studies and poses, at best, an archaeological problem. What has been attempted here is to describe some of the discursive preconditions and effects of the reading of portrait photographs, which can sometimes imply the linkage of an individual with an image. For the art historical treatment of portraiture this approach might encourage the realisation that the relationality between sitter and image is complexly constructed in the act of viewing, and that “the subject of portraiture” is not necessarily congruent with the sitter. The portrait practices studied here challenge the commonsensical assumption that a portrait is ‘of a person’.

Due partly to the better documentation of artistic practices, recent publications on English eighteenth-century portraiture frequently deal with socio-historical aspects of, and the social and economic structures underlying the production and circulation of portraits. The most important example of this scholarship is Marcia Pointon’s Hanging the Head (1993) which seeks to treat portraiture not merely as an artistic genre, but as an interactive dynamic, a social system, and an ideological mechanism. Three critical points, however, should be made. The historical discourses on art necessitate a discussion of painted portraiture in the perspective of an aesthetics of production, while the discourses on portrait photography under investigation here often neglect that terrain in favour of a more strongly reception-oriented epistemology. Yet, despite the fact that Pointon refers to portraiture as a “communicative act”, her analysis primarily spells out the side of the utterance in that communication, rather than the semiotic dynamics of reception. Secondly, Pointon deals with the question of subjectification only in relation to the sitters of their own portraits, whereas there appear to be multiple instances in which the subjects of photographic portraiture are not identical with the sitters. Thirdly, eighteenth-century painted portraiture was closely connected to the notion of the biographical narrative, the relation between an individual and an image being articulated as ‘character’. In photographic portraiture, the notion of the biographical remained much more tentative, if it was not altogether absent as in some of the scientific contexts concerned with problems such as typology or identity.[11]

Photographic studio portraiture aspired to the tradition of painting and, as we will see in the last chapter, followed some of its principles of composition. Yet, in addition to the fact that this was only one of the applications of photographic portraiture, the technical and material conditions of photography meant a decisive modification of the notion of character and of the self-relation articulated in the photographic visuo-social economy. Human-scientific photographic portraiture departed from the system of portraiture to the degree that it standardised its products and sought meaning in systematic variations, rather than in individual representations. Pointon characterises portraiture as a langue, as a system of social signification which, for the art practices of the eighteenth century, can be spelled out more or less precisely. The positivist human scientists of the nineteenth century deliberately unlearned older, physiognomic systems and sought to develop new modes of decoding facial images.

Despite such obvious differences, the extant historiographical literature on portrait photography, of which a recent collection edited by Graham Clarke forms a good example, generally treats the genre as a continuation of the artistic tradition.[12] It approaches the portrait as “the actual or attempted revelation of individual character through the depiction of a likeness of a person’s body, especially the face,”[13] and thus fails to address the complexity of the system of photographic portraiture. Not only is the self-consciousness of the sitter posited as a precondition for portraiture proper to take place, but there is also a distinct lack of historical awareness that surfaces when the object of investigation is described universalistically as “the space between subject and image, between ourselves and our images.”[14] Portraits are regarded as the results of a “complex and often unpredictable contract between photographer and sitter,” whose joint intentions combine as the “meaning” of the photograph. To the degree that such approaches fail to pull the rug from underneath the commonsensical assumptions about portraiture and remain stuck in interpretations of sitters’ characters, evaluating the “tonality of expression,” “revealing the subject’s soul,”[15] they replicate rather than help to understand the functions of specific, limited forms of portraiture.

Exceptional among the essays in Clarke’s collection is a thoughtful essay about certain theoretical continuities between painting and photography written by Stephen Bann. Seeking to trace a continuity between painted and photographic portraiture, it describes the systematic erasure of the code of physiognomy in both genres, an effect which Bann identifies in an “excess of expression”. Bann treats signification as a property of the image, and the intrinsic character of the image as an effect of the painter’s intention. From an art historical point of view, such assumptions may make sense, in the context of photographic portraiture however it seems impossible to make authoriative statements about the intrinsic meaning of certain formal qualities of images.

Rather, the present study forms an attempt at taking the problem of photographic portraiture beyond the question of the visual representation of the faces either of concrete individuals or of human types, towards the concept of faciality (visagéité) which has been suggested by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to describe a semiotic regime that is based on the rudimentary form of the face and that effects processes of subjectification.[16] Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical writings of the 1970s offer a highly original approach to the history of the modern individual and provide a toolbox of heuristic theoretical devices that, even in the rudimentary form in which it is presented here, allows for a fresh look at the processes of signification related to the dispositif photographique. The notion of a politics of the face quoted earlier derives from Deleuze and Guattari’s contention that the face represents a semiotic system which is historically and socially specific and related closely to modern European capitalist societies strongly informed by Christianity.[17]

The primary process on which facialisation rests is “becoming the same”, the production of unified, “molar”, identical entities out of a multiplicity of different singularities. Molarisation, the productive process of “making the same”, plays on the overlaying of such singularities according to degrees of similarity, i.e. difference, commonsensically turning what is similar into “one”. “Identification” is a process of making the same. It singles out and defines an object or body that is “only the sum total of the graspings to which it lends itself,”[18] and establishes an arbitrary connection between the object and a category: “An equivalence is imposed between two orders that lifts a body out of its uniqueness and places it in a system of ‘difference’ (‘not that’) in which it is reduced to the Same (one in a class of ‘not that’s’).” The end effect of the process of modern individuation is identity, i.e. “being in one’s assigned category and the paths through the social field associated with it.” Identification is a “diagram”, a principle of realising an assumed, inherent sameness of unbounded human bodies with limited social personae. The diagram of identity is actualised in images which, mediated by a technical or social apparatus, strip bodies of their corporeality in favour of substrates like soul, subjectivity, personality, identity: “the infolding of a forcibly regularised outside.” Portraiture, then, is what Deleuze and Guattari call an abstract machine, a system that realises the diagram of identity and places bodies, iconic representations, and identities in relations to each other.

The notion of faciality refers not so much to concrete individual faces as to a semiotic regime in which the face stands as a metaphor for a “white wall/black hole system”. The face forms at the same time a wall or screen from which the signifier bounces off, and a hole that draws the forces effecting processes of subjectification. “The concrete face vaguely begins to take shape on the white wall. It vaguely begins to appear in the black hole. […] Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an abstract machine of faciality [visagéité] which produces them at the same time as it gives the signifier its white wall and subjectivity its black hole. Thus the black hole/white wall system is, to begin with, not a face but the abstract machine that produces faces […].”[19] The concrete face is a surface, a map, which has to be conceptually separated from the body and recoded in relation to an order of identity. Thus, in portrait photographs, the head and even the entire body can be facialised in that they are removed from the stratum of the organism and connected to other strata, such as a semiotic of signifiance and subjectification. For this double movement of decoding and recoding, of removal and reconnection, Deleuze and Guattari use the terms “deterritorialisation” and “reterritorialisation”.

The processes of identification and facialisation force the insertion into specific economies and organisations of social power. Each facial unit is constituted in a binary or “biunivocal” relation with another: “it is a man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, ‘an x or a y.’ […] Concrete faces are produced and transformed on the basis of these units, these combinations of units.”[20] The machine of facialisation rejects faces that do not conform or seem suspicious, and thus produces a series of successive divergence-types of deviance. However, in an expansive system of bifurcations, every face eventually has to be recognised and inscribed by the abstract machine into its overall grid. Normalities and deviances are computated according to their degrees of deviance in relation to the Standard White-Man face. In a universalising gesture which also persisted throughout the scientific endeavours we will be examining here, the abstract machine does not tolerate an exterior.

The resulting processes of subjectification are series of syntheses, of infoldings on different strata. “The subject is not psychological, it is not contained in any one mind. It is the interactions between people. […] The subject is a transpersonal abstract machine, a set of strategies operating in nature and spread throughout the social field.”[21] Most powerfully, the subject experiences itself as the cause and ruler of its enunciations and actions, fully and consciously interiorising social laws as the choices of the rational cogito. The beginnings of subjectivity emerge in the behavioral patterns based on the child’s primary recognition of responses from the outside. The feedback or redundancy of that recognition is soon transformed into the practical application of memory, i.e. habits. These lead on to the more complex cognitive operations of reflection and self-recognition: the subject emerges from the void of redundancy that gasps as the “me” recognises itself as the “I”. The syntheses and interaction of such recognitions are called a “socius”, the abstract machine of society, which in the modern European case runs on powerful programmes of molarisation.

The actual event of affixing a notion of self to a photographic representation, the microphysics of subjectification through the dispositif photographique, can be described in terms of this concept of the self as a folding in the surface of the outside.[22] The dispositif photographique maps out a representational, facial surface into which bodies are inscribed, and in the folds of which relations to the self emerge. The “subjective resonance” is contingent, on the one hand, on the representational redundancy of the depicted concrete face, and on the other hand, on the “black hole of consciousness” that pulls away from the non-identical. Some of the effects of subjectification we will come across include: making social deviance governable; reinserting individuals into the normalised social order; providing a professional identity; adapting the constitution of truth claims to an altered epistemological matrix. It is in social effects like these that we detect the emergence of the visual economy of individuals in which photographs of bodies are traded against the currencies of subjecthood. The dispositif photographique structures this economy, in which subjectifications are articulated by material practices. It is a facialising machine.

These considerations outline a theoretical horizon rather than the concrete analytical tools of the present study whose initial approach is determined by three main problems or axes: the face as a semiotic matrix; subjectivity as an interface in the field of social interaction; and photography as a dispositif that mediates between and partly generates the other two. The study will be concerned with some specialised applications and theorisations of portrait photography in the human sciences.[23] It attempts neither a comprehensive overview over all such practices, nor a social or technical history of human scientific photography. The approach taken is epistemological rather than strictly historical, and aims at gaining a deeper understanding of the visual regime of the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, it seeks to broaden and deepen the material foundations of the ongoing discussion about scientific photography.[24] That is why the chapters covering anthropology, psychiatry, and criminal anthropology, put greater emphasis on the presentation of historical material, while the discussions in the second part are based on existing research on police photography and bourgeois studio photography. Here I mainly present new interpretations of known material, whereas Part I includes previously undiscussed sources.

The book should, then, be read in the first place as a contribution to the history of photography. It engages with the intersection of the histories of science and representation and discusses new forms of visual engagement of the observer in science which were connected to the use of photography. At the same time,the study can be understood as a contribution to the history of the modern individual.[25] It does not claim to give definitive answers, but hopes to raise some significant points about the use of portrait photography, and further to formulate questions and define areas for future research. One such area which here had to be all but ignored is the question of gender. More research will have to be done on the historical conceptualisations of ‘natural difference’ and the relationship between gender and knowledge articulated by the scientific discourses under investigation.[26] Instead, the current study is a contribution to the historical self-conceptions of European male elites, of those individuals most prone to be subjectified as Standard White Men.

The period covered here, i.e. circa 1850 to 1910, starts with the improvement of photographic techniques around 1850 when the medium came into wider use and became a topic of general discussion. The ‘origins’ of scientific daguerreotypy and photography will have to be almost neglected, and no more than a few passing remarks will be made to the related, historically preceeding artistic tradition of ‘painting the passions’, to physiognomy, or phrenology.[27] They would doubtlessly have added to the historical depth of the argument, yet, the format chosen for the present study did not allow excursions into those fields. Marking the end of the period, we can, after the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, observe what Sekula has called “the general demise of an optical model of empiricism.”[28] Parallel to this development in the scientific episteme, there was a technically spurred “perceptual revolution” which effected radical changes in the formation of the modern field of perception. A movement from linearity to multi-perspectivity and a breakdown of the time-space continuum traversed such diverse areas as the theory of physics, cinematography, scientific representation, art and literature.[29] We will see that the same dynamic can also be traced in the photographic practices examined in the present study.

The materials that have chiefly been drawn on come from contemporary published sources from the human scientific disciplines, including both journals and independent publications, exhibition reports and conference proceedings. Based on a discourse-analytical methodology, textual analyses are put into a comparative perspective in order to elucidate structural features of the epistemology of photographic applications. The relatively minor role of descriptions and analyses of images is consequential from the concern with the nineteenth-century epistemology of photographs, rather than with their phenomenology.

Summary of chapters

The first chapter maps the disparate terrain across which photography found applications in scientific contexts. Individual sections deal with theoretical, historical and practical aspects of nineteenth-century scientific photography, with sociological conceptions of the modern, ‘normal’ individual, and with the wide-ranging disciplinary field of anthropology which forms the backdrop for many human scientific practices that will be discussed later. Rather like when sketching a topographical map, some of the lines will initially appear unmotivated. They will, however, prove to be necessary for the development of the argument in the course of the book which falls into two main parts, focusing on discursive strategies of classification and identification, respectively.

The first part discusses anthropological, psychiatric and criminal anthropological applications of portrait photography. The aim here is to provide detailed accounts of the discourses about photography, and of the ways in which photographic evidence was discursively integrated into the respective scientific arguments. Each chapter takes a different focus which is determined partly by different emphases in the source material, and partly by the strategic need to cover a variety of theoretical problems across a range of topics.

Thus, chapter two on anthropology deals with the suggestions made in research manuals for the deployment of photography during travels, and with the related theory of photographic production. In the psychiatric textbooks of the period which are reviewed in chapter three, much greater emphasis was placed on problems of reading portrait photographs, and on the impact that the reception of visual images might have on psychiatric practices. An extensive analysis of John Conolly’s “The Physiognomy of Insanity” will provide important insights into the mechanisms of subjectification triggered through the contemplation of photographic portraits by physicians and patients. The fourth chapter looks at the competing visual regimes of the Italian and French schools of criminal anthropology and seeks to unravel the particular place that photographs held in Cesare Lombroso’s semiotics of indexicality. These examinations of the production, the reception, and the semiotic regimes in human scientific disciplines will serve to map the fractured epistemological matrix from which the notion of the modern subject emerged. The impacts of acts of human scientific classification went far beyond the constitution of repressive structures of social control.

This theme is further elaborated upon in Part II which deals with applications of photography as a means of identification and individual characterisation, rather than with strategies of classification. The modern subject is described as a meticulously engineered component of the social formation which most forcefully identifies itself as the subject of its social functionality. Chapter five describes this process with regard to police photography and argues that the self-conceptions of portrayed criminals, as well as of the police officers administering the archive of signaletic filing cards, are an integral, structural part of the mechanism of identification. Finally, in Chapter six, I argue that the composition of characteristic portraits by commercial studio photographers hinged on similar strategies of the reductive synthesis of a multiplicity of aspects into the oneness of a sitter’s personality, and on the constructive adaptation of these characteristics to the disposition of the photographic apparatus.

The discussion of the genre of photographic portraiture is thus taken away from the intentional triangle of photographer, sitter, and image, and placed into the context of a field of forces in which the social agents are constituted by the structural applications of which they experience themselves to be the authors. The argument of the book moves from the strictly authorial models of anthropological photography, to an analysis of studio photography in which the construction of those models of authorship itself is shown to be dependent on the wider formations of which the dispositif photographique forms part.

[1] Raulff (1984), p.53 [Von nun an wird niemand mehr bilderlos, wird niemand mehr gesichtslos leben: in den Jahren 1870 bis 1890 ereignet sich so etwas wie die Geburt des homo photographicus, des modernen Bildermenschen] .

[2] I will use the neutral personal pronoun ‘it’ when refering to the individual as a ‘yet ungendered’ discursive shifter. If this idiosyncratic ‘Germanism’ irritates (in German, it is das Individuum), that irritation may function as a reminder of the ambiguity of gender conceptions in the discourses which I Iook at, even if I do not always address it head-on. Whereas ‘the individual’ generally denotes the pre-social material resource, I will use the term ‘Man’ in the emphatic, nineteenth-century sense of the ‘fully developed and normal (male) human being’. The ‘subject’ is a socialised individual with a sense of self and a self-relation.

[3] Foucault (1975/1977), p.321-2; cf also Mauss (1938/1979) for a condensed history of the notion of the ‘person’, and Foucault (1988), (1990).

[4] Tagg (1988), Green (1984a) and (1984b), Phéline (1985), Sekula (1986), Merzeau (1988). These are only exemplary references; others will be made where appropriate.

[5] On the concept of the dispositif, cf Foucault (1976/1978), ch.4.3, and Foucault (1977/1978); cf also Deleuze (1989).

[6] For celebrity photography, cf Peters (1983), Prescott (1985), and McCauley (1985), esp. ch.3, p.53-84.

[7] Cf Heppner (1990) for an extensive bibliography, and Lohmann-Siems (1972) for a discussion of the concept of portraiture and its treatment in art history.

[10] Cf e.g. Boehm (1985), Campbell (1990), and Koerner (1993).

[11] Cf also Wendorf (1990), whose study about eighteenth-century literary and painted portraits has substantially deepened the understanding of the semiotic structures governing the system of portraiture.

[12] Cf Maddow (1977), Honnef (1982), Clarke (1992).

[15] Roger Cardinal in ibid., p.20, and Pam Roberts, ibid., p.64.

[16] Deleuze/Guattari (1980/1988), cf esp. p.167-91; cf also the useful interpretation by Massumi (1992).

[17] The concept of facialisation might also help to work towards an understanding why, as Pointon reminds us, European art portraiture prior to the sixteenth century did not prioritize the head at the expense of the body in the way that post-Renaissance art does (cf Pointon (1993), p.7).

[18] Massumi (1992), p.36; following quotations from ibid., p.91, 84, 112.

[21] Massumi (1992), p.26; cf also ibid., p.80-1.

[23] These applications have received growing attention from historians since the 1970s; cf Rouillé/Marbot (1986) for a good overview over the research area.

[24] For examples of an overly abbreviated treatment of the status of photography in the work of figures like Alphonse Bertillon or Cesare Lombroso, cf Merzeau (1988) and Regener (1990).

[25] For recent contributions to the history of the modern individual, cf Carrithers (1985), Taylor (1986), Giddens (1991).

[26] For some exemplary case studies in this field, cf Jordanova (1989).

[27] For daguerreotypy, cf Rudisill (1971), Gernsheim (1968); for the history of ‘painting the passions’, cf Kirchner (1991); for physiognomy in general, cf Tytler (1982), esp. p.20-97, Dumont (1984), and for its role in the nineteenth century, cf Wechsler (1982) for France, and Cowling (1989) for England; for phrenology, cf Lantéri-Laura (1970), de Guistino (1975), Cooter (1984).